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ABSTRACT
I analyze a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms,
where I observe firm and technology characteristics, as well as the type of scheduled
payments, whether fixed and/or variable. I find first that technology type influences
the chances of the parties reaching an agreement, and second, that the explanations
for observed payments based on moral hazard or risk aversion alone are not
satisfactory. I argue that all these theories fail to take into account the fact that the
contractual relationship is extended along time and that the parties will choose the








The international transmission of technology often takes the form of bilateral
agreements between firms, with the parties signing a binding contract. However, the
transmission of technology is subject to some difficulties not present in the transmission
of other inputs to production. These difficulties, especially in the case of tacit knowledge,
may even prevent the parties to the transaction from reaching a successful agreement. In
order to alleviate these problems, they can choose different contract characteristics. In
this paper, I study whether there is evidence for scheduled payments being chosen in
response to these difficulties.
Inherent to any international transfer of technology, there is a double-sided
asymmetric information problem. Since the seller is better acquainted with the technology
to be transferred, he will be able to better assess its value. Yet, in the case of international
technology transfer, the buyer knows the local market better than the seller: he can more
accurately estimate the level of demand, potential competitors, and legal or accounting
standards.
This asymmetric information may induce opportunistic behavior by the parties.
Arrow (1969) first points out to a double-sided moral hazard problem in the transmission
of technology. On the one hand, the seller may not undertake all the effort necessary for
a successful transfer of the technology. On the other, the buyer may renege on payments2
once he masters the technology that he has acquired, or can misreport the profit accruing
from the implementation of the technology.
In addition to opportunistic behavior, the actual usage of any technology on a
specific firm is a risky task. The results, in terms of increased profits, of using a new
technology, are subject to uncertainty, especially if it implies the introduction of a new
product or there is a high degree of tacit knowledge involved in the transmission. For
instance, the implementation of a given cost-saving technology on a specific firm might
turn out to be a failure, and no actual reduction in cost is achieved. Moreover, a seller
faces a potential selection problem, since he must choose which firm to sell the
technology to, with a given degree of uncertainty regarding the buyer’s type.
Scheduled payments can be chosen so as to mitigate these problems. The fact that
the parties agree on fixed or output-based payments can be a means of providing the
right incentives, to screen among potential buyers, or to share risk between the buyer and
the seller. This paper studies which, if any, of these explanations is the most consistent
with the evidence presented in this paper. In order to do so, I will study a database with
321 contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991.
Lack of adequate data has been an obstacle to the validation of theoretical models
of technology transfer. In a pioneering study, Caves et al (1983) employ survey data to
point out the potential failures of the licensing market. These failures stem from small-
numbers bargaining, appropriability problems, uncertainty, transaction costs, imperfect3
information and opportunism. They claim that specific contract clauses are used to solve
these problems.
Arora (1996) studies data on the acquisition of technology by Indian chemical
firms. He finds that the transfer of know-how is bundled together with other
complementary inputs, in order to avoid opportunistic behavior by both parties.
However, we have to be careful when extrapolating his conclusions, since this paper
studies the chemical industry and the case of a developing country.
Anand and Khanna (2000) use Securities Data Corporation (SDC) data on
licensing agreements to find inter-industry differences in exclusivity, cross-licensing, ex-
ante versus ex-post technology transfers, and licensing to related versus unrelated parties.
They argue that inter-industry differences in the protection of intellectual property rights
are driving these results, although they do not provide an accurate measure of the
strength of IPRs in each industry.
Macho-Stadler et al (1996) first study the database used in this paper. They find
that know-how is more likely transferred between affiliated parties and that contracts for
the transmission of know-how will typically include royalty payments. The suggest that
moral hazard on the seller’s side is the main force driving these results.
In a related branch of the literature, Lafontaine (1992) examines franchising data
to determine that two-sided moral hazard is the theoretical explanation most consistent
with the observed data. A similar result is presented in Brickley (2003), using variability
across states in legislation on termination of the contract by the franchisor. Furthermore,4
in a theoretical analysis, Battacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) argue that, in the presence of
double-sided moral hazard, the optimal contract involves a fixed fee plus a royalty.
However, while the franchising literature takes this optimal sharing rule (fixed fee plus
royalty) as given, we observe many technology licensing contracts that do not include
variable payments.
In this paper, I find evidence of technology transferred internally being different
from that transferred in arm’s-length transactions. Furthermore, after analyzing the firms’
choice of scheduled payments, I find that standard moral hazard, risk-aversion or
asymmetric information models provide incomplete explanations for observed payment
data, and thus miss, if taken separately, an important dimension of the contractual
relationship.
The organization of this paper is as follows: section 2 compares the characteristics
of fixed and royalty payment contracts for the sale of technology. Section 3 describes data
employed in this article. Section 4 analyzes the data relating it to the theoretical models
previously discussed. Finally, section 5 presents some conclusions possible extensions.
2. Fixed fees and royalty payments in technology transfer contracts
Fixed payments have been regarded as the most efficient way to transfer the right
to use a specific technology. Any variable payment, either a cost-increasing per unit
royalty, or a revenue-reducing royalty on the price charged, introduces a distortion on the
buyer’s output decision, and, therefore, a departure from its first-best level. However, a5
majority of contracts include output-based payments, leading us naturally to ask why we
observe such pattern.
If the seller has more complete information on the technology to be transacted,
royalty payments can be used as a signal for better technology (see for instance Gallini
and Wright, 1990). Considering the case of drastic innovations, in a separating
equilibrium, royalty payments are a signal for good technology. Fixed payments are
predicted to be present in any contract, since they signal bad technology and are a rent-
extracting device in royalty payment contracts. Therefore, whenever tacit knowledge is
part of the agreement, we should more often observe output-based payments, because
tacitness implies an increased difficulty in describing the technology itself, and thus, more
asymmetric information on the seller’s side. Moreover, according to this type of models,
no output-based payments should be observed in affiliated transactions.
Asymmetric information on the buyer’s side can also be a factor increasing the
probability of output-based payments. If the buyer, which is already settled in the local
market, has a more accurate knowledge of demand characteristics, the seller can choose
variable payments to extract information about the local market from the buyer. Under
those circumstances, it may be difficult for the seller to determine the size of an upfront
fee. Indeed, a fixed fee promptly accepted by the buyer is a signal of it being too low.
This could justify the parties agreeing on variable payments, with or without an upfront
fee. Both in this case and in the previous one, fixed payments would be mere rent-
extracting devices.6
Risk-sharing arguments can also be put forth as potential explanations for
observed scheduled payments. Specifically, output-based payments can be used as a
means of providing insurance to the buyer (see for instance Bousquet et al, 1995). If
buyers’ risk aversion is correlated with size, we should observe a negative correlation
between the buyer’s size and the likelihood of observing output-based payments, as well
as between size and the royalty rate itself. On the other hand, the correlation between size
and the probability of observing fixed payments should be positive. However, this implies
the introduction of the bothersome assumption of firms being risk-averse. Within
affiliated transactions, risk-sharing considerations should not be influencing observed
payments, and thus, size should not have an influence on the likelihood of observing
either type of payment.
A negative correlation between the probability of observing variable payments
and size (and positive correlation between the probability of observing fixed payments
and size can also be the result of the buyer being cash-constrained. If cash availability is
correlated with size, the likelihood of a fixed payment being unaffordable for the buyer in
some states of the world is higher for smaller firms. Thus, we will more likely observe
royalty payments (and less likely fixed payments) the smaller the buyer.
Moral hazard has been widely regarded as a factor influencing the type of
payment the parties agree on. In the transmission of tacit knowledge, both parties costly
provide noncontractible inputs. On the one hand, the seller must reveal that knowledge
to the buyer, which involves a greater effort than in the case of codified knowledge. On7
the other hand, the buyer is typically responsible for commercialization and marketing
efforts, and has asymmetric information about local demand conditions. If not provided
with the right incentives, the parties can perform transaction-specific investments below
the optimal level.
If the seller’s effort is crucial for the correct implementation of the technology
and commercialization is relatively unimportant, a royalty rate can be used in unaffiliated
transfers to induce the seller to provide the appropriate type of technology. In the case of
commercialization efforts to be relatively more important, we will more likely observe
fixed payments. In this line, Choi (2001) builds up a model of technology transfer with
double-sided moral hazard, where the first-best outcome, a fixed fee contract and no
output distortion due to the presence of a royalty, cannot be implemented. The second-
best contract involves a royalty that induces the licensor and the licensee to perform
transfer-specific investments. In his model, affiliated transfers are predicted to originate
fixed payments only. As it will be seen below, this prediction is at odds with actual
practice.
Finally, if there is heterogeneity in buyers’ types and this information is unknown
to the seller, scheduled payments may also be used in order for screening purposes. If the
dispersion of potential buyers’ types is high, a fact that can be due either to unobserved
heterogeneity on the buyer’s side or to the potential buyer’s not having enough
information regarding the technology to be acquired, then a higher fixed fee and lower8
royalty rate should be observed. Furthermore, in the case of affiliated transactions, the
first-best contract, i.e. fixed fees only, should always be observed.
All the theoretical models presented predict that technology transfers generate
fixed payments only. This fact will clearly be inconsistent with the evidence presented in
this paper. As we will observe below, most affiliated contracts include output-based
payments. This fact should lead us to consider that more complete explanations. In
particular, a transaction-cost approach may provide a more satisfying explanation for the
observed data. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) compare cost plus and fixed payments
procurement contracts to conclude that the determinant of contract choice is the tradeoff
between ex ante incentives and ex post costly renegotiation. In particular, low incentive
contracts (cost plus) have the advantage of greater adaptability than high incentive
contracts (fixed payment). In their analysis, the characteristics of the project determined
contract choice.
In this paper, I will compare fixed-payment with variable-payment schedules and
discuss whether technology and firm characteristics increase the chances of observing one
or the other. While fixed payments introduce no output distortions, this payment scheme
is more sensitive to the hazards associated with an extended relationship: changes in
demand, legislation, competitive conditions, input prices, or technology. Additionally, it
does not provide the seller with the right incentives and, on the other hand, he does not
benefit from marketing or commercialization efforts by the buyer. By contrast, the royalty
schedule provides both parties with the right incentives to perform costly transaction-9
specific actions. On the one hand, it induces the seller to provide the buyer with the best
available technology. On the other hand, it induces the buyer to exert (suboptimal)
marketing effort, while allowing the seller to directly benefit from such effort. Contracts
that stipulate output-based payments are less likely to be renegotiated. If the parties agree
on fixed payments and demand is lower (or higher) than expected, there is a clear
incentive to renegotiate. Agreeing on output-based payments is a solution to this
problem.
The problem the parties face at the time of designing the different contract
clauses is how to estimate the value of the relationship. This value, both to the buyer and
to the seller, is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, and is not present in the provision
of other inputs to production. It is much easier to stipulate the per-unit price at which
one party must supply some physical input to the other party, but it is very difficult to
estimate the value of the right to use some technology. In this assessment, a number of
factors must be taken into account, such as the level of demand, the development of
alternative technologies, the degree of tacitness of technology, regulation, or the efforts
made by the parties for the correct implementation of the technology on the purchasing
firm.
Duration of the contractual relationship between the parties is a dimension that
has been often overlooked in the literature. All the theoretical models considered focus
on a one-period transaction, and not on a protracted relationship. However, in real
practice most contracts have a more extended time horizon, which increases uncertainty10
concerning the value of the relationship and increase the likelihood of hazards an
unforeseen situations. This may be an unimportant factor in affiliated transfers, but may
be crucial in the case of arm’s-length transactions.
This temporal dimension makes fixed payment contracts a less attractive
instrument than output-based payment contracts, the longer the relationship between the
parties. Under a royalty contract, both parties have the right incentive to provide (second-
best) transaction-specific inputs and thus, reduce the incentives for opportunistic
behavior. Moreover, output-based payments reduce the probability of costly
renegotiation of the contract, by lowering the number of states of nature in which the
parties have an incentive to renegotiate a too high (or too low) fixed payment. Output-
based payments adjust the value of the relationship to the level of demand, at the cost of
introducing a wedge between the actual and the first-best level of production. Then, in
contracts where the time horizon is shorter, the value is easier to estimate, and thus, it will
be more likely for us to observe fixed payments linked to them.
3. The Data
Description of the database
All Spanish firms that imported technology were required, up to 1992, to report
to the Spanish Ministry of Industry the terms of the technology purchase. In order to do
that, the buyer had to file a form, named ‘TE-30’, with the ‘Servicio de Información y
Transferencia de Tecnología’ (Technology Transfer Office), a branch of the Spanish11
Ministry of Industry. In some cases, along with this form, the firms sent other
documentation, such as a copy of the contract or bills justifying payments made.
However, since this type of control is no longer allowed by the European Union, filing
was finished in 1992. A description of the variables included in the form can be found in
the Appendix.
The buyer of the technology had to describe the features of the imported
technology in his report. This allows us, first, to determine the degree of tacitness in
technology, and second, to exclude those transfers with a dubious technological content.
Contrary to the case of a patent or a utility model, know-how is noncodified knowledge
and it is not protected by law against imitation. Thus, these transfers are more sensitive to
opportunistic behavior both by the seller and the buyer: whereas the seller can provide a
suboptimal level of know-how, the buyer can imitate the technology transferred and
renege on the contract. Furthermore, the outcome of the implementation of this type of
technology on a specific firm is expected to be more uncertain than in the case of
codified knowledge. For all these reasons, the transfer of know-how is likely to affect
scheduled payments.
I also observe whether the technology to be transferred refers to a specific
product or it is a process technology. In principle, a new product implies a higher degree
of uncertainty when introduced into a new market than a new process to be applied to an
existing product. A process technology implies less variability of revenue if demand-
shocks are industry-specific. On the other hand, if a product is explicitly mentioned in the12
contract, it will be more likely to the parties to link payments to revenues accruing from
that product. Whether ownership of the technology has been transferred is included as
well. Regarding the buyer’s characteristics, sales in the year before the filing of the form
will be used to proxy for its size. I also observe whether the buyer has any linkages with
the seller, and whether or not he performs R&D activities. Regarding the seller’s
characteristics, both the seller’s industry and country are observed. The seller’s country
will be used as an indicator of asymmetric information on the local market. 
The sample. Stylized facts
Out of the forms sent to the Ministry in 1991, I have included in the sample 319
observations
1 and 262 of them included the actual contract along with the form. Table 1
presents selected characteristics of the contracts, classified by industry of the buyer. The
industry groups correspond to the first digit of the buyer’s industry code, according to
Spanish classification (CNAE-74). In the final sample, I have only included those
transfers that explicitly mention that either a patent, a utility model, an industrial design,
                                                
1 The Spanish Ministry of Industry had no clear classification plan for the forms. They were literally put in
boxes as they were received and stored in a basement located in the central offices of the ministry, in
Madrid. Therefore, by randomly choosing some of these boxes and copying the forms contained in them, I
do not expect any significant bias arising from the sampling procedure.13
know-how, or software (not to be resold
2) is transferred. Thus, I have deliberately
excluded contracts where the technological content is less clear, for instance those where
the buyer is just a software retailer or for the provision of technical assistance. This
reduces the final sample to 209 valid observations.
As seen in Table 1, most contracts are concentrated in Non-energetic Minerals
and Chemicals, Metal Transformation, and Other Manufacturing. There is a moderate
degree of heterogeneity between industries in the proportion of unaffiliated contracts, as
well as in the proportion of contracts that include the transfer of know-how. There is also
high variation between industries in the proportion of firms conducting R&D, being it
lower in services, and in size. Finally, the proportion of contracts including royalty
payments in the first year is remarkably high in Agriculture and in Other Manufacturing,
being it low in Services.
Since the main focus of this study is on scheduled payments contained in the
contract, the type of payment to be made, whether fixed or variable, constitutes very
valuable information, which is absent in other studies. Expected fixed and variable
payments, in monetary terms, had to be reported by the buyer for the five years following
the agreement. However, output-related payments are based upon estimates of future
                                                
2 I have included software only if it is a program to be used by the buyer. There are some contracts in the
sample where the buyer merely acts as a commercial agent to sell software in Spain. I have deliberately
excluded such contracts from the final sample. The criterion is to include the contract only if the right to
sell the software program has not been included in the agreement.14
sales, which make them not very accurate and they are most frequently overestimated.
3
Nevertheless, I observe is the royalty rate in those contracts that include output-based
payments, which constitutes much more reliable data.
Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c, summarize expected payments recorded in the contracts for
the five years following the agreement. This constitutes the time window such
information is available. As it can be seen in the third column of Table 2a, the percentage
of contracts that include both fixed and variable payments in the first year is only 20% in
full sample, and 25% in the subsample of arm’s-length transactions. This fact is at odds
with the existing theoretical literature, which predicts the widespread use of mixed
payments. On the other hand, we can observe that the proportion of contracts that
include fixed payments is decreasing in time, both in the case of affiliated and unaffiliated
transfers. Thus, if fixed payments are to be made, they are scheduled for the first years of
the duration of the contract. Furthermore, it is precisely contracts that involve fixed
payments the ones whose duration is the shortest: among the 47 contracts whose
duration is only one year, 39 of them are fixed-payment only contracts, and the remaining
8 are contracts that involve output-based payments. No payment that includes a fixed
                                                
3 I suspect royalty payments to be overestimated because if actual payments exceeded the reported amount,
the buyer was bound to send a second report to the Ministry. For that reason, firms chose to overestimate
upcoming payments in their reports. Indeed, scheduled payments are higher than actual payments recorded
by the Bank of Spain. Thus, I do not rely on foreseen royalty payments, but rather on upfront payments
and the royalty rate.15
part plus a royalty has a duration of one year only. Half of these contracts include variable
payments only in the second year.
Thus, as we consider subsequent years, it will be those contracts that included
output-based payments those that will survive in the sample, either because included
variable payments from the beginning or because the contract stipulated a switch from
fixed or mixed payments to variable payments.
The second remarkable fact that can be observed in Table 2c is the high
proportion of contracts that include variable payments within affiliated transactions. The
theoretical literature has always regarded these transactions to be free from the problems
present in arm’s-length transfers and has predicted affiliated transfers to originate fixed
payments only (see for instance Choi, 2001). Specifically, for a wholly-owned subsidiary,
the efficient transfer would involve a zero fixed fee and a zero royalty. Thus, either
opportunistic behavior is present in a higher degree in this type of transactions, or fixed
payments contracts are not superior to fixed payment contracts as they have always been
regarded.
Out of these two explanations, the first one is less plausible than the second. It is
hard to imagine that opportunistic behavior is a more acute problem within transactions
between related parties. Therefore, we should ask what are the advantages of royalty
payments that offset the output distortion that the increase in marginal cost means.
4. Empirical evidence16
In this section, I start by checking if internally transferred technology has the
same characteristics as technology transferred between unaffiliated firms. I expect
affiliated transfers to be absent from the kind of problems present in arm’s-length
transactions. These problems could be preventing some unaffiliated transfers from being
carried out. Thus technology or firm-specific characteristics may be influencing both the
likelihood of agreement (and thus of the contract being observed) as well as scheduled
payments.
I suspect that, within unaffiliated transfers, contracts that include the transfer of
know-how are the ones most likely to suffer from these problems. Since this type of
knowledge is tacit and not protected by law against imitation, the incentive problems will
be more evident in these transfers. Therefore, it may be case that if know-how is to be
transferred, the likelihood of two unaffiliated parties reaching an agreement be lower.
Affiliation and technology type
In order to verify which contract characteristics vary with affiliation, I run several
probit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator of the inclusion of a
patent, a utility model, a model or design, and know-how. Among the independent
variables, which are firm and contract characteristics, I include an indicator of the transfer
being affiliated. The sign and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient for this
variable will shed some light on whether technology type varies with affiliation. Some
technology types may be difficult to be transferred between two unrelated parties,17
because of the problems mentioned above. The most obvious candidate is know-how,
since this type of technology is not legally protected against imitation. A positive effect of
affiliation on the probability of know-how being transferred is consistent with a positive
probability of two unrelated parties not reaching a successful agreement for the transfer
of tacit knowledge. If we assume affiliated transfers to be free from these problems, then
the proportion of affiliated transfers where know-how is included should be much higher.
Another possible explanation is that firms may want to keep their most sensitive
technology in-house and are reluctant to sell it to an unrelated firm.
In order to control for industry-specific effects, I have also included five industry
dummies. I have merged observations in Commerce, Restaurants, Transport,
Communications, Finance, Services to Firms and Other Services into a single group,
because their economic activity is services rather than producing physical goods.
Additionally, I have included separate dummies for Metal Transformation, Other
Manufacturing, Construction and Agriculture. Other regressors are an indicator of the
technology referring a specific product, the logarithm of sales, the logarithm of the
proportion of Spanish imports coming from the seller’s country, and indicators of the
performance of R&D by the seller, and whether both firms are in the same industry.
Table 3 reports estimated coefficients in these specifications. As it can be seen,
there is no significant effect of affiliation on the likelihood of a patent, utility model or
model and design being included in the contract. However, in the specification with
know-how as the dependent variable, the coefficient for affiliation is positive and18
statistically significant. This result suggests that the technology that is actually transferred
is different between affiliated and unaffiliated transfers, specifically, tacit knowledge being
more difficult to appear if the transfer is unaffiliated. The buyer’s size, on the other hand,
does not seem to have an influence on the likelihood of tacit knowledge being
transferred.
The fact stressed in the previous subsection may cause problems when estimating
the impact of the transfer of know-how on the likelihood of observing output-based
payments and on the size of the royalty rate itself. If the technology that is to be
transferred includes know-how, the likelihood of the parties agreeing on an actual transfer
is lower than if no know-how is included in the transaction. If know-how influences both
the likelihood of successful agreement and the contract terms, ignoring this fact may be
introducing significant biases in the estimation of the effect of the inclusion of tacit
knowledge on the likelihood of the parties setting output-based payments. By contrast, I
do not expect affiliated transactions to suffer from this kind of bias.
Technology type, firm characteristics, and scheduled payments
In this section, I will estimate the effect of technology type, firm characteristics
and a measure of asymmetric information on the probability of the parties including
variable payments in the agreement. I carry out all the analysis conditional on the contract
being observed. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates of a probit regression where the
dependent variable is an indicator of the parties including royalty payments in the first19
year. I focus the analysis on the first year of the life of the contract because, at it could be
seen in the previous section, the probability of the occurrence of royalty payments is
increasing in the year payments are scheduled for.
Among the regressors, I include indicators of a patent and/or know-how being
included in the contract, affiliation between the parties, the technology being a product
technology, and the seller being established in a European Union country. I also include
the logarithm of the buyer’s sales, proxying for its size, as well as the percentage of
foreign ownership in the buyer’s equity. Finally, I included an indicator of the agreement
having a duration of only one year.
In column (i) of Table 4, only the indicators of product technology and duration
being one year only are statistically significant at the 1% level. The logarithm of sales is
also statistically significant, but only at the 10% level. The negative sign and statistical
significance of the indicator of the relationship having a duration of one year is consistent
with the claim that the extent of such relationship makes the value of the transaction
more difficult to estimate and thus, makes the choice of output-based payments a more
attractive choice than fixed payments only. One-sided or double-sided moral hazard
models would predict this variable to have no effect on the likelihood of observing
royalty payments, whereas risk-sharing arguments would be consistent with this result,
since a more extended duration would increase the uncertainty associated with the
transaction.20
Column (ii) reports estimated coefficients for the unaffiliated subsample. As it can
be observed, the results in terms of sign and statistical significance of the coefficients are
similar to those encountered in column (i). As in the previous case, the buyer’s size seems
to be an important factor in the decision of the parties to include output-based payments.
For that reason, columns (iii) and (iv) carry out separate analysis, dividing the unaffiliated
subsample into two, where the cutoff point is the median value of the buyer’s sales in the
year previous to the agreement. What I try to check is whether the buyer’s size has an
influence on the contracts that can be implemented. It may be the case that a small buyer
can not afford paying an upfront fee, due to cash constraints, for instance, and thus the
parties will more likely agree on royalty payments. By contrast, larger buyers might not
face this problem, and a fixed-payments only contract may be a feasible option. 
As we can observe comparing columns (iii) and (iv), the coefficient for know-how
is positive and statistically significant in the subsample of larger firms, which is consistent
with the predictions of double-sided moral hazard models. In the subsample of smaller
firms, know-how does not seem to make the occurrence of royalty payments more likely.
Actually, most of these contracts include them, regardless of other contract
characteristics. More importantly, carrying out a likelihood ratio test, comparing the value
of the log-likelihood functions in the unaffiliated subsample (i.e. restricting the value of
the parameters to be the same for small and large firms) with the sum of the values of
that function in each of the two subsamples, reveals that such difference is statistically21
significant at the 5% level. This is consistent with the argument that the buyer’s size
constrains the choice of feasible contracts.
Table 5 estimates the effect of selected contract and buyer’s characteristics on
both the likelihood of observing royalty payments and on the size of the royalty rate
itself. Moral hazard models predict the royalty rate to be larger the more important the
seller’s transaction-specific investment. Risk-sharing arguments predict a positive
relationship between the royalty rate and the buyer’s risk aversion and the inherent
riskyness of the relationship.
The econometric specification that I use is a Heckman selection model, where I
allow for different variables and heterogeneous coefficients in the selection and
regression equations. In all the specifications, the dependent variable is the logarithm of
the royalty rate. In columns (i) and (ii) I report estimated coefficients for the selection and
regression equations, respectively, for the full sample. By contrast, in columns (iii) and (iv)
I use observations of unaffiliated transactions only. In this table, I report robust standard
errors, which could modify, in some cases, the inference with respect to the previous
table.
We can observe that the variables that are expected to have an impact on the size
of the royalty fee actually alter the likelihood of observing such type of payments, but not
the royalty rate itself. While most of the theoretical literature focuses on the optimal
sharing rule, and on the effect of asymmetric information or risk on the optimal royalty
rate, I find that where they really have an impact is on the decision to include output-22
based payments. Once that decision has been made, the size of the royalty rate seems to
be insensitive to these factors. There is evidence, though, in favor of risk-sharing
arguments, since the effect of the buyer’s size is negative and statistically significant. This
suggests that smaller technology buyers are willing to pay a higher royalty rate in exchange
for not having to pay an upfront fee.
Finally, it is remarkable to observe that the indicator of the seller being
established in a European Union country has a negative and statistically significant effect
on the likelihood of observing royalty payments being paid in the first year. Therefore,
firms located in countries with closer economic ties are more able to assess the value of
the relationship ex ante, as well as weigh the risks involved in the relationship and, thus a
fixed payment mechanism can be implemented. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper, I present a contract-level database of imports of disembodied
technology by Spanish firms in 1991. By inspecting the data, I find that the proportion of
contracts including both fixed and variable payments in the first year of the agreement is
much lower than expected, while the theoretical literature predicts the widespread use of
this type of scheduled payments. After the first year of duration of the contract, most of
those that survive involve royalty payments only. Furthermore, I find that contracts for
the sale of technology between affiliated firms originate mostly output-based payments, a
fact which is at odds with the predictions of moral hazard models, which assume these23
transfers to be free from such problems. A variable that is important in the determination
of scheduled payments is the buyer’s size. This can be interpreted as evidence in favor of
explanations based on risk-sharing: a parent firm may be willing to provide insurance to
its subsidiary or to a cash-constrained small unaffiliated firm.
I also find that the duration of the relationship has a positive, statistically
significant effect on the likelihood of encountering output-based payments. I interpret
this fact as supporting the hypothesis that the most important factor determining
scheduled payments is the ability of the parties to estimate the value of the relationship
between them, and all the theories mentioned are just partial, incomplete explanations of
the problems that firms located in different countries face when trying to transact
disembodied technology. Finally, I only found evidence of the buyer’s size having an
influence on the size of the royalty rate. This variable seems to be quite insensitive to
other factors that have been considered in the literature.
References
Ackerberg, D., and M. Botticini. 2002. Endogenous matching and the empirical
determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy. 110(3):564-591.
Aghion, P., and J. Tirole. 1994. The management of innovation. Quarterly Journal of
Economics. 109:1185-1207.
Allen, D., and D. Lueck. 1999. The role of risk in contract choice. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization. 15(3):704-736.24
Allen, D. 1992. Contract choice in modern agriculture: cropshare versus cash rent. Journal
of Law and Economics. 35:397-426.
Amemiya, T. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Anand, B., and T. Khanna. 2000. The Structure of Licensing Contracts. Journal of Industrial
Economics. 48(1):103-135.
Arora, A. 1992. The transfer of technological know-how to developing countries:
technology licensing, tacit knowledge, and the acquisition of technological capability.
PhD dissertation. Stanford University.
Arora, A. 1996. Contracting for tacit knowledge: the provision of technical services in
technology licensing contracts. Journal of Development Economics. 50:233-257.
Arora, A., A. Fosfuri, and A. Gambardella. 1999. Markets for Technology (Why Do We
See Them, Why Don’t We See More of Them and Why We Should Care). Mimeo,
Carnegie Mellon University, February.
Arrow, K.J. 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In
National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Arrow, K. J. 1969. Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of
Technological Knowledge. American Economic Review. 59(2):29-35.
Bajari, P. and S. Tadelis. 2001. Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of
Procurement Contracts. Rand Journal of Economics. 32(3):387-407
Beggs, A. W. 1992. The licensing of patents under asymmetric information. International
Journal of Industrial Organization. 10:171-191.
Bhattacharyya, S., and F. Lafontaine. 1995 Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of
share contracts. RAND Journal of Economics. 26(4):761-781.
Bousquet, A., H. Crémer, M. Ivaldi, and M. Wolkowicz. 1998. Risk Sharing in Licensing.
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 16:535-554.
Brickley, J. 2003. Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from
Franchising. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, forthcoming.25
Caves, R., H. Crookell, and P. Killing. 1983. The imperfect market for technology
licenses. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 45(3):249-268.
Choi, J. P. 2001. Technology transfer with moral hazard. International Journal of Industrial
Organization. 19:249-266.
Cohen, W., and D. Levinthal. 1989. Innovation and Learning: the Two Faces of R&D.
Economic Journal. 99:569-596.
Cohen, W., and D. Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning
and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 35:128-152.
Contractor, F. J. 1981. International technology licensing. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Craig, A., and R. Hogg. 1995. Introduction to Mathematical Statistics. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Eswaran, M., and A. Kotwal. 1985. A theory of contractual structure in agriculture.
American Economic Review. 75:352-367.
Gallini, N., and R. Winter. 1985. Licensing in the theory of innovation. RAND Journal of
Economics. 16:237-252.
Gallini, N., and B. D. Wright. 1990. Technology transfer under asymmetric information.
RAND Journal of Economics. 21:147-160.
Greene, W. H. 1997. Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kamien, M. 1992. Patent licensing. in Aumann, R., and S. Hart, Eds. Handbook of Game
Theory, vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Kamien, M., and Y. Tauman. 1986. Fees versus royalties and the private value of a patent.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. 101:471-491.
Katz, M., and C. Shapiro. 1985. On the licensing of innovations. RAND Journal of
Economics. 16:504-520.
Laffont. J.-J., and M. Matoussi. 1995. Moral hazard, financial constraints, and
sharecropping in El Oulja. Review of Economic Studies. 62:381-399.
Lafontaine, F. 1992. Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results. RAND
Journal of Economics. 23(2):263-283.26
Lerner, J., and R. Merges. 1998. The control of technology alliances: an empirical analysis
of the biotechnology industry. Journal of Industrial Economics. 46:125-156.
Macho-Stadler, I., X. Martínez-Giralt and D. Pérez-Castrillo. 1996. The role of
information in licensing contract design. Research Policy. 25:43-57.
Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Mathewson, G., and R. Winter. 1985. The economics of franchise contracts. Journal of
Law and Economics. 28:503-526.
Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo. 1992. Manual para la Transferencia de
Tecnología. Madrid, Spain: Secretaría de Estado de Industria, Ministerio de Industria,
Comercio y Turismo.
Oxley, J. 1997. Appropriability hazards and governance in strategic alliances: a transaction
cost approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 13(2):387-409.
Pérez-Rodríguez, S. 1996. Metodología para el estudio de los procesos de transferencia de
tecnología: aplicación al caso español. PhD dissertation. UNED, ETSII.
Stiglitz, J. 1974. Incentives and risk sharing in sharecropping. Review of Economic Studies.
41(2):219-255.
Spulber, D. 1999. Market microstructure: intermediaries and the theory of the firm. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, C., and A. Silberston. 1973. The economic impact of the patent system: a study of the British
experience. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Teece, D. J. 1977. Technology transfer by multinational firms: the resource cost of
transferring technological know-how. Economic Journal. 87:242-261.
Williamson, O. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, NY: Free
Press.27
Appendix. Variables included in the TE30 form
For each transaction involving acquisition of technology by a Spanish firm from a
foreign firm, the buyer had to send a form, called TE-30 to the Spanish Ministry of
Industry. The variables included in the TE-30 form, and that had to be reported by the
firms were the following:
1. Firm's name and address. This variable could not be recorded because the
buyer’s identity is kept anonymous by law.
2. Declaration number.
3. Industry of the buyer. The code is given according to Spanish classification.
4. Data about the buyer, in millions of pta: a) total equity b) net worth c) sales in
previous year.
5. Percentage of foreign ownership in the buyer’s equity.
6. a) Does buyer perform R&D activities? (Yes, No).
    b) Does buyer transfer technology abroad? (Yes, No).
7. Country of seller.
8. Industry of seller.
9. Linkages of the seller with the Spanish firm: whether a)there are no linkages,
b)they have the same parent firm or c)the seller owns the buyer. A discrete variable has
been created that takes, respectively, the value of zero, one and two, if the affiliation
between the parties falls into one of the former categories.28
10. Data regarding the nature of the transaction. The buyer had to check one or
more of the following twelve categories:
Patents Utility models Know-how Software









11. Transaction type: whether the contract involved a) transfer of ownership b)
right to use the technology or c) commercial rights of the product. Three indicator
variables, for each transaction type, have been created. These variables are not mutually
exclusive.
12. Description of the technology transferred. This is a variable that takes the
value zero if it refers to a specific product, one if it is a process technology, or two if
both.
13. Scheduled payments. The buyer had to report an estimate of the fixed and the
variable payments to be made in the first five years of duration of the contract.
In some cases, the actual contract signed by the parties is available for inspection.
Whenever this is the case, the following variables are also included:
14. Territoriality clauses: countries where the product could be sold. A discrete
variable was constructed with the value of zero if it was Spain, one if a larger territory –
generally Western Europe- and two if the product could be sold anywhere in the world.29
15. Exclusivity: whether the buyer had the exclusive right to use the technology in
the territory agreed upon. When explicit mention of exclusivity was made in the contract,
this variable took the value zero if the contract was non-exclusive, one if semiexclusive
and two if exclusive.
16. Duration of the contract in years.
17. Confidentiality clause: a dummy variable with a value of one was created if
such clause was present in the contract, and zero otherwise.
18. Improvements. If the contract explicitly considered the obligation of the
parties to inform the other party about new discoveries relative to the technology
transferred, a discrete variable was constructed. In the case of only the seller having the
obligation to keep the buyer informed, the variable took the value of zero. If it was the
other way around, one, and two if both parties had the obligation to keep the other party
updated.
19. No competition. In the case of express ban by the seller to produce or sell any
product that might compete against the seller's product by the buyer, this variable takes
the value of one.
20. Sublicensing. If the buyer can sublicense the other firm, this variable takes the
value of one, and zero if an explicit prohibition to sublicense was made.
21. Royalties increasing or decreasing in quantity or time. In the case of the
royalty rate not being constant, if it was increasing, the value is zero. It was one if
decreasing.30
22. Input tying. In some cases, the contract specifies that the buyer must buy a
particular input from the seller. If that was the case, this variable took the value of one,
and zero otherwise.
23. Legal defense. In the case of third parties litigating about the transferred
technology, the value of the variable is zero if the legal defense was to be made by the
seller. If the defense had to be carried out by the buyer, the variable takes the value of
one. 
24. Minimum royalties. If there was a clause by which the buyer was obliged to
pay the seller a minimum amount in concept of royalties (excluding fixed payments), a
discrete variable with a value of one was recorded, and zero otherwise.
I do not expect, however, any significant bias coming from the way the sample
was drawn. The files were stored in the same order as they were received, without any
intermediate classification according to sector or any other criteria. The files were selected
by just opening consecutive boxes in which they were stored. This procedure actually
alleviates selection problems caused by the way the sample was chosen.
All the contracts included in the sample refer to transactions made in 1991. Pérez
(1996) provides summary statistics for the contracts submitted to the Ministry in 1991
(see Table A.1). 5,168 forms were filed in 1991, with 4,611 of them reporting about first-
time contracts, 525 extensions of existing agreements, and 32 modifications of previously
signed contracts. The number of Spanish firms signing contracts that year was 1,955, thus
averaging 2.6 contracts per firm, with 1,267 firms signing just one contract. Regarding the31
type of technology purchased, transfers of technology involving a patent represent less
than 3% of the total, while software includes about 23% of the contracts. Ownership of
the technology is transferred in 22% of the total, and in 68%, only the right to use the
technology was transferred.
Regarding the characteristics of the buyers, less than half of the firms – exactly
46% of them- have no foreign ownership in their equity. These firms sign on average
more contracts per firm, but these contracts involve lower payments. In fact, firms with
no foreign ownership have scheduled payments of pta 24.6m per contract, whereas firms
with a majority (more than 50%) of foreign ownership, have payments of pta 111m per
transaction. Firms with direct or indirect linkages to the seller of the technology represent
23% of the total, with higher payments per contract.
Only 35% of the firms purchasing technology from abroad declare to be
performing R&D activities. Firms doing R&D are much more active in terms of number
of transactions (2.7 vs 2.1) but not in payments per transaction (60.5 vs 68.5). Most
technology imported by Spanish firms comes from OECD countries. The U.K. leads in
total transactions (21%), with the U.S. being the main destination of payments (23%) for
the acquisition of technology.
If we look at payments by industry and by source country, some countries appear
to be the main source of technology in specific industries. For instance, most computer-
related technology is imported from the U.S. whereas Germany is the main source of
motor vehicles technology.32
The data was collected manually and by inspection of the contracts and the forms.
For this reason, some observations of specific variables can be missing in the data while
actually being present in the contracts. The reason is that the contracts had to be read one
by one and sometimes the specification of some variables was not explicitly made in a
separate clause, but as part of another one. It is likely, therefore, that in some cases, some
variables such as confidentiality or exclusivity might have been overlooked.
Table A.1 summarizes the number of observations of each contract clause. Two
remarks have to be made about the quality of the data. First, the TE-30 form was filled
out by each buyer individually. This creates a problem of misreporting, since the selection
of one or several categories in the main object of the transaction was discretionarily made
by each individual firm. On the other hand, the quantities reported as payments are
estimates made by the firms based on future sales and they tend to be overestimated. The
reason is that if the actual quantity was higher than the one reported at the time of filing,
a new report had to be sent. For this reason, I expect an upward bias in this variable.
However, in this paper I use categorical variables, i.e. whether the payments are fixed or
output-based, and not the actual amounts reported. 33











% % % % %
Agriculture 11 45.5 100 27.3 90.1 10.24
Energy and water 2 50 0 50 50 12
Non-energ. minerals, chemicals 46 87 52.2 54.3 69.6 4.01
Metal transformation 67 64.2 58.2 59.7 62.9 4.23
Other manufacturing 32 50 56.2 28.1 87.5 4.59
Construction 8 50 62.5 62.5 62.5 2.12
Commerce, restaurants 19 42.1 47.4 52.6 68.4 5.88
Transport, communications 1 0 100 100 100 5
Finance, services to firms 23 39.1 26.1 65.2 34.8 6.5
Other services 4 75 0 75 25 3
Total 213 60.6 53.1 52.6 66.2 4.91
Table 1b. Firm characteristics by industry




% % (pta mn)
Agriculture 11 81.8 63.6 1568
Energy and water 2 50 50 440785
Non-energ. minerals, chemicals 46 69.6 69.6 15351
Metal transformation 67 70 70.1 22418
Other manufacturing 32 59.4 40.6 4439
Construction 8 50 12.5 10931
Commerce, restaurants 19 52.6 21.1 4881
Transport, communications 1 100 0 n.a.
Finance, services to firms 23 51.1 26.1 4558
Other services 4 50 75 1644
Total 213 65.3 53.5 1855534










First 33.33 47.42 19.25 213 4.91
Second 19.88 69.88 10.24 166 4.81
Third 12.50 82.35 5.15 136 4.67
Fourth 7.76 87.93 4.31 116 4.75
Fifth 7.34 88.07 4.59 109 4.72










First 38.13 37.41 24.46 139 5.09
Second 23.81 62.86 13.33 105 4.92
Third 12.20 82.93 4.88 82 4.86
Fourth 7.04 88.73 4.23 71 4.92
Fifth 6.06 89.39 4.55 66 4.93










First 24.32 66.22 9.46 74 4.65
Second 13.11 81.97 4.92 61 4.65
Third 12.96 81.48 5.56 54 4.36
Fourth 8.89 86.67 4.44 45 4.47
Fifth 9.30 86.05 4.65 43 4.3935
Table 3. Probability of inclusion of certain contract clauses
Dependent variable is an indicator of the transfer of:
patent utility model model and
design
know-how
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Affiliation 0.042 -0.012 -0.019 0.308 ***
0.067 0.012 0.067 0.07
Product 0.28 *** -0.038 *** 0.086 -0.105
0.061 0.027 0.068 0.081
ln(sales) 0.064 0.01 -0.013 0.013
0.066 0.007 0.056 0.065
ln(sales) squared -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004
European Union 0.002 -0.006 0.052 -0.067
0.063 0.009 0.064 0.079
Same industry -0.031 -0.013 0.037 0.137 *
0.079 0.014 0.071 0.08
Log-likelihood -90.31 -23.392 -82.6 -103.73
Pseudo-R2 0.175 0.219 0.136 0.177
Sample size 190 190 172 190
All regressions include industry dummies.
Standard errors reported below the estimated coefficient.
* indicates statistically significant at the 90% level (two-tailed test).
** indicates statistically significant at the 95% level (two-tailed test).
*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% level (two-tailed test).36
Table 4. Probit regression of likelihood of variable payments
Dependent variables: indicator of the presence of output-based







(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Patent 0.056 0.05 -0.022 0.151 **
0.086 0.122 0.115 0.059
Know-how 0.123 0.044 0.358 ** 0.092
0.103 0.127 0.172 0.094
Affiliation 0.117
0.088
Product 0.366 *** 0.389 *** 0.312 *** 0.257 ***
0.083 0.103 0.132 0.083
Duration=1 year -0.646 *** -0.638 *** -0.721 ***
0.094 0.107 0.196
European Union -0.095 -0.088 -0.068 -0.165 **
0.084 0.117 0.07 0.074
ln(sales) 0.188 ** 0.212 *** 0.152 0.114 **
0.061 0.074 0.116 0.074
ln(sales) squared -0.015 *** -0.018 *** -0.01 -0.01 ***
0.004 0.005 0.008 0.004
Log-likelihood -67.4 -46.864 -18.357 -31.178
Pseudo-R2 0.438 0.447 0.446 0.403
Sample size 190 128 62 98
All regressions include industry dummies. 
Standard errors reported below the estimated coefficient.
* indicates statistically significant at the 90% level (two-tailed test).
** indicates statistically significant at the 95% level (two-tailed test).
*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% level (two-tailed test).37









(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Patent 0.298 0.035 0.38 -0.136
0.306 0.14 0.361 0.201
Know-how 0.482 * -0.002 0.439 -0.106
0.272 0.186 0.307 0.244
Affiliation 0.56 **
0.272
Product 1.046 *** 0.946 ***
0.237 0.269
Duration=1 year -2.654 *** -2.266 ***
0.461 0.489
ln(sales) -0.079 * -0.115 *** -0.077 -0.087 **
0.057 0.036 0.06 0.043
European Union -0.861 *** -0.767 ***
0.275 0.291
Constant 1.05 * 2.25 *** 0.99 * 2.086 ***
0.551 0.331 0.581 0.364
Log likelihood -200.388 -138.534
Sample size 190 128
All regressions include industry dummies.
Standard errors reported below the estimated coefficient.
* indicates statistically significant at the 90% level (two-tailed test).
** indicates statistically significant at the 95% level (two-tailed test).
*** indicates statistically significant at the 99% level (two-tailed test).38
Table A.2. Number of observations by contract clause
 
Clause Times Clause Times Clause Times
Patents 58 Technical assist. 171 Exclusivity 141
Util. Models 11 R&D abroad 8 Confidentiality 145
Know-how 129 R&D parent 5 Improvements 81
Software 40 Ownership 40 No competition 28
Trademarks 48 Right to use 210 Sublicensing 111
Models, designs 45 Right to sell 116 Input tying 33
Franchise 9 Product 141 Defense 46
Engineering 51 Process 225 Minimum royalty 37
Databases 28 Territoriality 148 Total contracts 319